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ABSTRACT
This is an attempt to derive broad, strategic lessons from the diverse experience with economic
growth in last fifty years. The paper revolves around two key arguments. One is that neoclassical
economic analysis is a lot more flexible than its practitioners in the policy domain have generally
given it credit. In particular, first-order economic principles – protection of property rights, market-
based competition, appropriate incentives, sound money, and so on – do not map into unique policy
packages. Reformers have substantial room for creatively packaging these principles into
institutional designs that are sensitive to local opportunities and constraints. Successful countries
are those that have used this room wisely. The second argument is that igniting economic growth
and sustaining it are somewhat different enterprises. The former generally requires a limited range
of (often unconventional) reforms that need not overly tax the institutional capacity of the economy.
The latter challenge is in many ways harder, as it requires constructing over the longer term a sound
institutional underpinning to endow the economy with resilience to shocks and maintain productive
dynamism. Ignoring the distinction between these two tasks leaves reformers saddled with
impossibly ambitious, undifferentiated, and impractical policy agendas.
Dani Rodrik










“[A]s far as the LDCs are concerned, it is probably fair  
to say that at least a crude sort of ‘justice’ prevails in 
 the economic policy realm.  Countries that have run 
 their economies following the policy tenets of the professionals 
 have on the whole reaped good fruit from the effort; 
 likewise, those that have flown in the face of these 
 tenets have had to pay the price.” 
 
-- Arnold C. Harberger (1985, p. 42) 
 
 
“When you get right down to business, there aren’t 
too many policies that we can say with certainty 
deeply and positively affect growth.” 
 
-- Arnold C. Harberger (2003, p. 215) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
  
Real per-capita income in the developing world grew at an average rate of 2.3 
percent per annum during the four decades between 1960 and 2000.
1  This is a high 
growth rate by almost any standard.  At this pace incomes double every 30 years, 
allowing each generation to enjoy a level of living standards that is twice as high as the 
previous generation’s.  To provide some historical perspective on this performance, it is 
worth noting that Britain’s per-capita GDP grew at a mere 1.3 percent per annum during 
its period of economic supremacy in the middle of the 19
th century (1820-1870) and that 
the United States grew at only 1.8 percent during the half century before World War I 
when it overtook Britain as the world’s economic leader (Maddison 2001, Table B-22, 
265).  Moreover, with few exceptions, economic growth in the last few decades has been 
accompanied by significant improvements in social indicators such as literacy, infant 
mortality, life expectation, and the like.  So on balance the recent growth record looks 
quite impressive. 
  
However, since the rich countries themselves grew at a very rapid clip of 2.7 
percent during the period 1960-2000, few developing countries consistently managed to 
                                                 
1 This figure refers to the exponential growth rate of GDP per capita (in constant 1995 US$) for the group 
of low- and middle-income countries.  The data come from the World Development Indicators 2002 CD-
ROM of the Word Bank. 
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close the economic gap between them and the advanced nations.  As Figure 1 indicates, 
the countries of East and Southeast Asia constitute the sole exception.  Excluding China, 
this region experienced per-capita GDP growth of 4.4 percent over 1960-2000.  Despite 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 (which shows as a slight dip in Figure 1), countries 
such as South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia ended the century with productivity levels 
that stood significantly closer to those enjoyed in the advanced countries.   
  
Elsewhere, the pattern of economic performance has varied greatly across 
different time periods.  China has been a major success story since the late 1970s, 
experiencing a stupendous growth rate of 8.0 percent (as compared to 2.0 percent in 
1960-80).  Less spectacularly, India has roughly doubled its growth rate since the early 
1980s, pulling South Asia’s growth rate up to 3.3 percent in 1980-2000 from 1.2 percent 
in 1960-1980.  The experience in other parts of the world was the mirror image of these 
Asian growth take-offs.  Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa both experienced robust 
economic growth prior to the late 1970s and early 1980s—2.9 percent and 2.3 percent 
respectively—but then lost ground subsequently in dramatic fashion.  Latin America’s 
growth rate collapsed in the “lost decade” of the 1980s, and has remained anemic despite 
some recovery in the 1990s.  Africa’s economic decline, which began in the second half 
of the 1970s, continued throughout much of the 1990s and has been aggravated by the 
onset of HIV/AIDS and other public-health challenges.  Measures of total factor 
productivity run parallel to these trends in per-capita output (see Table 1).         
  
Hence the aggregate picture hides tremendous variety in growth performance, 
both geographically and temporally.  We have high growth countries and low growth 
countries; countries that have grown rapidly throughout, and countries that have 
experienced growth spurts for a decade or two; countries that took off around 1980 and 
countries whose growth collapsed around 1980.   
 
This paper is devoted to the question:  what do we learn about growth strategies 
from this rich and diverse experience?  By “growth strategies” I refer to economic 
policies and institutional arrangements aimed at achieving economic convergence with 
the living standards prevailing in advanced countries.  My emphasis will be less on the 
relationship between specific policies and economic growth—the stock-in-trade of cross-
national growth empirics—and more on developing a broad understanding of the 
contours of successful strategies.  Hence my account harks back to an earlier generation 
of studies that distilled operational lessons from the observed growth experience, such as 
Albert Hirschman’s The Strategy of Economic Development (1958), Alexander 
Gerschenkron’s Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (1962) or Walt 
Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth (1965).  This paper follows an unashamedly 
inductive approach in this tradition.  
 
A key theme in these works, as well as in the present paper, is that growth-
promoting policies tend to be context specific.  We are able to make only a limited 
number of generalizations on the effects on growth, say, of liberalizing the trade regime, 
opening up the financial system, or building more schools.  The experience of the last 
two decades has frustrated the expectations of policy advisers who thought we had a good   3
fix on the policies that promote growth—see the shift in mood that is reflected in the two 
quotes from Harberger that open this paper.  And despite a voluminous literature, cross-
national growth regressions ultimately do not provide us with much reliable and 
unambiguous evidence on such operational matters.
2  An alternative approach, and the 
one I adopt here, is to shift our focus to a higher level of generality and to examine the 
broad design principles of successful growth strategies.  This entails zooming away from 
the individual building blocks and concentrating on how they are put together.   
 
The paper revolves around two key arguments.  One is that neoclassical economic 
analysis is a lot more flexible than its practitioners in the policy domain have generally 
given it credit.  In particular, first-order economic principles—protection of property 
rights, contract enforcement, market-based competition, appropriate incentives, sound 
money, debt sustainability—do not map into unique policy packages.  Good institutions 
are those that deliver these first-order principles effectively.  There is no unique 
correspondence between the functions that good institutions perform and the form that 
such institutions take.  Reformers have substantial room for creatively packaging these 
principles into institutional designs that are sensitive to local constraints and take 
advantage of local opportunities.  Successful countries are those that have used this room 
wisely.   
 
The second argument is that igniting economic growth and sustaining it are 
somewhat different enterprises.  The former generally requires a limited range of (often 
unconventional) reforms that need not overly tax the institutional capacity of the 
economy.  The latter challenge is in many ways harder, as it requires constructing a 
sound institutional underpinning to maintain productive dynamism and endow the 
economy with resilience to shocks over the longer term.  Ignoring the distinction between 
these two tasks leaves reformers saddled with impossibly ambitious, undifferentiated, and 
impractical policy agendas.       
 
The plan for the paper is as follows.  The next section sets the stage by evaluating 
the standard recipes for economic growth in light of recent economic performance.  
Section III develops the argument that sound economic principles do not map into unique 
institutional arrangements and reform strategies.  Section IV re-interprets recent growth 
experience using the conceptual framework of the previous section.  Section V discusses 
a two-pronged growth strategy that differentiates between the challenges of igniting 
growth and the challenges of sustaining it.  Concluding remarks are presented in section 
VI.      
 
 
II.  What we know that (possibly) ain’t so 
  
Development policy has always been subject to fads and fashions.  During the 
1950s and 1960s, the “big push,” planning, and import-substitution were the rallying 
                                                 
2 Easterly (2003) provides a good overview of these studies.  See also Temple (1999), Brock and Durlauf 
(2001), and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001). 
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cries of economic reformers in poor nations.  These ideas lost ground during the 1970s to 
more market-oriented views that emphasized the role of the price system and outward-
orientation.
3  By the late 1980s a remarkable convergence of views had developed around 
a set of policy principles that John Williamson (1990) infelicitously termed the 
“Washington Consensus.”  These principles remain at the heart of today’s conventional 
understanding of a desirable policy framework for economic growth, even though they 
have been greatly embellished and expanded in the years since.   
 
The left panel in Table 2 shows Williamson’s original list, which focused on 
fiscal discipline, “competitive” currencies, trade and financial liberalization, privatization 
and deregulation.  These were perceived to be the key elements of what Krugman (1995, 
29) has called the “Victorian virtue in economic policy,” namely “free markets and sound 
money”.  Towards the end of the 1990s, this list was augmented in the thinking of 
multilateral agencies and policy economists with a series of so-called second-generation 
reforms that were more institutional in nature and targeted at problems of “good 
governance.”  A complete inventory of these Washington Consensus-plus reforms would 
take too much space, and in any case the precise listing differs from source to source.
4  I 
have shown a representative sample of ten items (to preserve the symmetry with the 
original Washington Consensus) in the right panel of Table 2.  They range from anti-
corruption and corporate governance to social safety nets and targeted anti-poverty 
programs.   
 
The perceived need for second-generation reforms arose from a combination of 
sources.  First, there was growing recognition that market-oriented policies may be 
inadequate without more serious institutional transformation, in areas ranging from the 
bureaucracy to labor markets.  For example, trade liberalization may not reallocate an 
economy’s resources appropriately if the labor markets are “rigid” or insufficiently 
“flexible.”  Second, there was a concern that financial liberalization may lead to crises 
and excessive volatility in the absence of a more carefully delineated macroeconomic 
framework and improved prudential regulation.  Hence the focus on non-intermediate 
exchange-rate regimes, central bank independence, and adherence to international 
financial codes and standards.  Finally, in response to the complaint that the Washington 
Consensus represented a trickle-down approach to poverty, the policy framework was 
augmented with social policies and anti-poverty programs. 
 
It is probably fair to say that a listing along the lines of Table 2 captures in broad 
brushstrokes mainstream thinking about the key elements of a growth program.  How 
does such a list fare when held against the light of contemporary growth experience?  
Imagine that we gave Table 2 to an intelligent Martian and asked him to match the 
growth record displayed in Figure 1 and Table 1 with the expectations that the list 
                                                 
3 Easterly (2001) provides an insightful and entertaining account of the evolution of thinking on economic 
development.  See also Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) and Krueger (1997).   
 
4 For diverse perspectives on what the list should contain, see Stiglitz (1998), World Bank (1998), Naim 
(1999), Birdsall and de la Torre (2001), Kaufmann (2002), Ocampo (2002), and Kuczynski and Williamson 
(2003). 
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generates.  How successful would he be in identifying which of the regions adopted the 
standard policy agenda and which did not?               
 
Consider first the high performing East Asian countries.  Since this region is the 
only one that has done consistently well since the early 1960s, the Martian would 
reasonably guess that there is a high degree of correspondence between its policies and 
the list in Table 2.  But he would be at best half-right.  South Korea’s and Taiwan’s 
growth policies, to take two important illustrations, exhibit significant departures from 
the Washington Consensus.  Neither country undertook significant deregulation or 
liberalization of their trade and financial systems well into the 1980s.  Far from 
privatizing, they both relied heavily on public enterprises.  South Korea did not even 
welcome direct foreign investment.  And both countries deployed an extensive set of 
industrial policies that took the form of directed credit, trade protection, export 
subsidization, tax incentives, and other non-uniform interventions.  Using the minimal 
scorecard of the original Washington Consensus (left panel of Table 2), the Martian 
would award South Korea a grade of 5 (out of 10) and Taiwan perhaps a 6 (Rodrik 1996).   
 
The gap between the East Asian “model” and the more demanding institutional 
requirements shown on the right panel of Table 2 is, if anything, even larger.  I provide a 
schematic comparison between the standard “ideal” and the East Asian reality in Table 3 
for a number of different institutional domains such as corporate governance, financial 
markets, business-government relationships, and public ownership.  Looking at this, the 
Martian might well conclude that South Korea, Taiwan, and (before them) Japan stood 
little chance to develop.  Indeed, such were the East Asian anomalies that when the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98 struck, many observers attributed the crisis to the moral 
hazard, “cronyism,” and other problems created by East Asian-style institutions (see 
MacLean 1999, Frankel 2000).     
 
The Martian would also be led astray by China’s boom since the late 1970s and 
by India’s less phenomenal, but still significant growth pickup since the early 1980s.  
While both of these countries have transformed their attitudes towards markets and 
private enterprise during this period, their policy frameworks bear very little resemblance 
to what is described in Table 2.  India deregulated its policy regime slowly and undertook 
very little privatization.  Its trade regime remained heavily restricted late into the 1990s.  
China did not even adopt a private property rights regime and it merely appended a 
market system to the scaffolding of a planned economy (as discussed further below).  It is 
hardly an exaggeration to say that had the Chinese economy stagnated in the last couple 
of decades, the Martian would be in a better position to rationalize it using the policy 
guidance provided in Table 2 than he is to explain China’s actual performance.
5            
 
                                                 
5 Vietnam, a less well known case than China, has many of the same characteristics: rapid growth since the 
late 1980s as a result of heterodox reform.  Vietnam has benefited from a gradual turn toward markets and 
greater reliance on private entrepreneurship, but as Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003) argue, it is hard to 
square the extensive role of the state and the nature of the property rights regime with the tenets of the 
Washington Consensus.  
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The Martian would be puzzled that the region that made the most determined 
attempt at remaking itself in the image of Table 2, namely Latin America, has reaped so 
little growth benefit out of it.  Countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Peru did more liberalization, deregulation and privatization in the course of a 
few years than East Asian countries have done in four decades.  Figure 2 shows an index 
of structural reform for these and other Latin American countries, taken from Lora 
(2001a).  The index measures on a scale from 0 to 1 the extent of trade and financial 
liberalization, tax reform, privatization, and labor-market reform undertaken.  The 
regional average for the index rises steadily from 0.34 in 1985 to 0.58 in 1999.  Yet the 
striking fact from Figure 1 is that Latin America’s growth rate has remained significantly 
below its pre-1980 level.  The Martian would be at a loss to explain why growth is now 
lower given that the quality of Latin America’s policies, as judged by the list in Table 2, 
has improved so much.
6  A similar puzzle, perhaps of a smaller magnitude, arises with 
respect to Africa, where economic decline persists despite an overall (if less marked) 
“improvement” in the policy environment.
7             
 
The Martian would recognize that the growth record is consistent with some of 
the higher-order economic principles that inspire the standard policy consensus.  A 
semblance of property rights, sound money, fiscal solvency, market-oriented incentives—
these are elements that are common to all successful growth strategies.
8  Where they have 
been lacking, economic performance has been lackluster at best.  But the Martian would 
also have to conclude that the mapping from our more detailed policy preferences (such 
as those in Table 2) to economic success is quite imperfect.  He would wonder if we 
cannot do better. 
 
                                                 
6 Lora (2001b) finds that structural reforms captured by this index do correlate with growth rates in the 
predicted manner, but that the impacts (taking the decade of the 1990s as a whole) are not that strong.  
Another econometric study by Loayza et al. (2002) claims that Latin America’s reforms added significantly 
to the region’s growth.  However the latter paper uses outcome variables such as trade/GDP and financial 
depth ratios as its indicators of “policy,” and therefore is unable to link economic performance directly to 
the reforms themselves.  Lin and Liu (2003) attribute the failure of the Washington Consensus to the non-
viability of enterprises created under the previous “distorted” policy regime and the political impossibility 
of letting these go bust. 
      
7 See also Milanovic (2003) for a closely related Martian thought experiment.  Milanovic emphasizes that 
economic growth has declined in most countries despite greater globalization. 
  
8 Here is how Larry Summers (2003) summarizes the recent growth evidence:  “[The] rate at which 
countries grow is substantially determined by three things: their ability to integrate with the global 
economy through trade and investment; their capacity to maintain sustainable government finances and 
sound money; and their ability to put in place an institutional environment in which contracts can be 
enforced and property rights can be established.  I would challenge anyone to identify a country that has 
done all three of these things and has not grown at a substantial rate.”  Note how these recommendations 
are couched not in terms of specific policies (maintain tariffs below x percent, raise the government 
primary surplus above y percent, privatize state enterprises, and so on), but in terms of “abilities” and 
“capacities” to get certain outcomes accomplished.  I will suggest below that these “abilities” and 
“capacities” do not map neatly into the standard policy preferences, and can be generated in a variety of 
ways.     
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III.  The indeterminate mapping from economic principles to institutional arrangements 
 
Here is another thought experiment.  Imagine a Western economist was invited to 
Beijing in 1978 in order to advise the Chinese leadership on a reform strategy.  What 
would she recommend and why? 
 
The economist would recognize that reform must start in the rural areas since the 
vast majority of the poor live there.  An immediate recommendation would be the 
liberalization of agricultural markets and the abolition of the state order system under 
which peasants had to make obligatory deliveries of crops at low, state-controlled prices.  
But since price liberalization alone would be inadequate to generate the appropriate 
supply incentives under a system of communal land ownership, the economist would also 
recommend the privatization of land.  Next, the economist would have to turn her 
attention to the broader implications of price liberalization in agriculture.  Without access 
to cheap grains, the state would be left without a source of implicit tax revenue, so tax 
reform must be on the agenda as well.  And in view of the rise of food prices, there must 
be a way to respond to urban workers’ demand for higher wages.  State enterprises in 
urban areas must be corporatized, so that their managers are in a position to adjust their 
wages and prices appropriately.   
 
But now there are other problems that need attention.  In an essentially closed and 
non-competitive economy, price-setting autonomy for the state behemoths entails the 
exercise of monopoly power.  So the economist would likely recommend trade 
liberalization in order to “import” price discipline from abroad.  Openness to trade in turn 
calls for other complementary reforms.  There must be financial sector reform so that 
financial intermediaries are able to assist domestic enterprises in the inevitable 
adjustments that are called forth.  And of course there must be social safety nets in place 
so that those workers who are temporarily displaced have some income support during 
the transition. 
 
   The story can be embellished by adding other required reforms, but the message 
ought to be clear.  By the time the Western economist is done, the reform agenda she has 
formulated looks very similar to the Washington Consensus (see Table 4).  The 
economist’s reasoning is utterly plausible, which underscores the point that the 
Washington Consensus is far from silly: it is the result of systematic thinking about the 
multiple, often complementary reforms needed to establish property rights, put market 
incentives to work, and maintain macroeconomic stability.  But while this particular 
reform program represents a logically consistent way achieving these end goals, it is not 
the only one that has the potential of doing so.  In fact, in view of the administrative and 
political constraints that such an ambitious agenda is likely to encounter, it is not 
implausible that there would be better ways of getting there.   
 
How can we be sure of this?  We know this because China took a very different 
approach to reform—one that was experimental in nature and relied on a series of 
institutional innovations that departed significantly from Western norms.  What is   8
important to realize about these innovations is that in the end they delivered—for a period 
of a couple of decades at least—the very same goals that the Western economist would 
have been hoping for: market-oriented incentives, property rights, macroeconomic 
stability.  But they did so in a peculiar fashion that, given the Chinese historical and 
political context, had numerous advantages.   
 
For example, the Chinese authorities liberalized agriculture only at the margin 
while keeping the plan system intact.  Farmers were allowed to sell surplus crops freely at 
a market-determined price only after they had fulfilled their obligations to the state under 
the state order system.  As Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) explain, this was an ingenious 
system that generated efficiency without creating any losers.  In particular, it was a 
shortcut that neatly solved a conundrum inherent in wholesale liberalization: how to 
provide microeconomic incentives to producers while insulating the central government 
from the fiscal consequences of liberalization.  As long as state quotas were set below the 
fully liberalized market outcome (so that transactions were conducted at market prices at 
the margin) and were not ratcheted up (so that producers did not have to worry about the 
quotas creeping up as a result of marketed surplus), China’s dual-track reform in effect 
achieved full allocative efficiency.  But it entailed a different infra-marginal 
distribution—one that preserved the income streams of initial claimants.  The dual track 
approach was eventually employed in other areas as well, such as industrial goods (e.g. 
coal and steel) and labor markets (employment contracts).  Lau et al. (2000) argue that 
the system was critical to achieve political support for the reform process, maintain its 
momentum, and minimize adverse social implications.   
 
Another important illustration comes from the area of property rights.  Rather 
than privatize land and industrial assets, the Chinese government implemented novel 
institutional arrangements such as the Household Responsibility System (under which 
land was “assigned” to individual households according to their size) and Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs).  The TVEs were the growth engine of China until the mid-
1990s (Qian 2003), with their share in industrial value added rising to more than 50 
percent by the early 1990s (Lin et al. 1996, 180), so they deserve special comment.  
Formal ownership rights in TVEs were vested not in private hands or in the central 
government, but in local communities (townships or villages).  Local governments were 
keen to ensure the prosperity of these enterprises as their equity stake generated revenues 
directly for them.  Qian (2003) argues that in the environment characteristic of China, 
property rights were effectively more secure under direct local government ownership 
than they would have been under a private property-rights legal regime.  The efficiency 
loss incurred due to the absence of private control rights was probably outweighed by the 
implicit security guaranteed by local government control.  It is difficult to explain 
otherwise the remarkable boom in investment and entrepreneurship generated by such 
enterprises.     
 
Qian (2003) discusses other examples of “transitional institutions” China 
employed to fuel economic growth—fiscal contracts between central and local 
governments, anonymous banking—and one may expand his list by including 
arrangements such as Special Economic Zones.  The main points to take from this   9
experience are the following.  First, China relied on highly unusual, non-standard 
institutions.  Second, these unorthodox institutions worked precisely because they 
produced orthodox results, namely market-oriented incentives, property rights, 
macroeconomic stability, and so on.  Third, it is hard to argue, in view of China’s 
stupendous growth, that a more standard, “best-practice” set of institutional arrangements 
would have necessarily done better.   
 
The Chinese experience helps lay out the issues clearly because its institutional 
innovations and growth performance are both so stark.  But China’s experience with non-
standard growth policies is hardly unusual; in fact it is more the rule than the exception.  
The (other) East Asian anomalies noted previously (Table 3) can be viewed as part of the 
same pattern: non-standard practices in the service of sound economic principles.  I 
summarize a few non-Chinese illustrations in Table 5.    
 
Consider for example the case of financial controls.  I noted earlier that few of the 
successful East Asian countries undertook much financial liberalization early on in their 
development process.  Interest rates remained controlled below market-clearing levels 
and competitive entry (by domestic or foreign financial intermediaries) was typically 
blocked.  It is easy to construct arguments as to why this was beneficial from an 
economic standpoint.  Table 5 summarizes the story laid out by Hellman, Morduck, and 
Stiglitz (1997), who coin the term “financial restraint” for the Asian model.  Where 
asymmetric information prevails and the level of savings is sub-optimal, Hellman et al. 
argue that creating a moderate amount of rents for incumbent banks can generate useful 
incentives.  These rents induce banks to do a better job of monitoring their borrowers 
(since there is more at stake) and to expand effort to mobilize deposits (since there are 
rents to be earned on them).  The quality and level of financial intermediation can both be 
higher than under financial liberalization.  These beneficial effects are more likely to 
materialize when the pre-existing institutional landscape has certain properties—for 
example when the state is not “captured” by private interests and the external capital 
account is restricted (see last two columns of Table 5).  When these preconditions are in 
place, the economic logic behind financial restraint is compelling.    
 
The second illustration in Table 5 comes from South Korea’s and Taiwan’s 
experiences with industrial policy.  The governments in these countries rejected the 
standard advice that they take an arms’ length approach to their enterprises and actively 
sought to coordinate private investments in targeted sectors.  Once again, it is easy to 
come up with economic models that provide justification for this approach.  In Rodrik 
(1995), I argued that the joint presence of scale economies and inter-industry linkages can 
depress the private return to investment in non-traditional activities below the social 
return.  Industrial policy can be viewed as a “coordination device” to stimulate socially 
profitable investments.  In particular, the socialization of investment risk through implicit 
bailout guarantees may be economically beneficial despite the obvious moral hazard risk 
it poses.  However, once again, there are certain prerequisites and institutional 
complements that have to be in place for this approach to make sense (see Table 5).       
       10
The third illustration in Table 5 refers to Japan and concerns the internal 
organization of the workplace, drawing on Aoki’s (1997) work.  Aoki describes the 
peculiar institutional foundations of Japan’s postwar success as having evolved from a set 
of arrangements originally designed for wartime mobilization and centralized control of 
resources.  He presents Japan’s team-centered approach to work organization and its 
redistribution of economic resources from advanced to backward sectors—arrangements 
that he terms “horizontal hierarchy” and “bureau-pluralism,” respectively—as solutions 
to particular informational and distributive dilemmas the Japanese economy faced in the 
aftermath of World War II.  Unlike the previous authors, however, he views this fit 
between institutions and economic challenges as having been unintended and 
serendipitous.   
 
Lest the reader think this is solely an East Asian phenomenon, an interesting 
example of institutional innovation comes from Mauritius (Rodrik 1999).  Mauritius 
owes a large part of its success to the creation in 1970 of an export-processing zone 
(EPZ), which enabled an export boom in garments to European markets.  Yet, instead of 
liberalizing its trade regime across the board, Mauritius combined this EPZ with a 
domestic sector that was highly protected until the mid-1980s, a legacy of the policies of 
import-substituting industrialization (ISI) followed during the 1960s.  The industrialist 
class that had been created with these policies was naturally opposed to the opening up of 
the trade regime.  The EPZ scheme provided a neat way around this difficulty (Wellisz 
and Saw 1993).  The creation of the EPZ generated new profit opportunities, without 
taking protection away from the import-substituting groups.  The segmentation of labor 
markets was particularly crucial in this regard, as it prevented the expansion of the EPZ 
(which employed mainly female labor) from driving wages up in the rest of the economy, 
and thereby disadvantaging import-substituting industries.  New profit opportunities were 
created at the margin, while leaving old opportunities undisturbed.  At a conceptual level, 
the story here is essentially very similar to the two-track reforms in China described 
earlier.  To produce the results it did, however, the EPZ also needed a source of investible 
funds, export-oriented expertise, and market access abroad, which were in turn provided 
by a terms-of-trade boom, entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, and preferential market access 
in Europe, respectively (Rodrik 1999; Subramanian and Roy 2003).    
       
In reviewing cases such as these, there is always the danger of reading too much 
into them after the fact.  In particular, we need to avoid several fallacies.  First, we cannot 
simply assume that institutions take the form that they do because of the functions that 
they perform (the functionalist fallacy).  Aoki’s account of Japan is a particularly useful 
reminder that a good fit between form and function might be the unintended consequence 
of historical forces.  Second, it is not correct to ascribe the positive outcomes in the cases 
just reviewed only to their anomalies (the ex-post rationalization fallacy).  Many accounts 
of East Asian success emphasize the standard elements--fiscal conservatism, investment 
in human resources, and export orientation (see for example World Bank 1993).  As I 
will discuss below, East Asian institutional anomalies have often produced perverse 
results when employed in other settings.  And it is surely not the case that all anomalies 
are economically functional.   
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The main point I take from these illustrations is robust to these fallacies, and has 
to do with the “plasticity” of the institutional structure that neoclassical economics is 
capable of supporting.  All of the above institutional anomalies are compatible with, and 
can be understood in terms of, neoclassical economic reasoning (“good economics”).  
Neoclassical economic analysis does not determine the form that institutional 
arrangements should or do take.  What China’s case and other examples discussed above 
demonstrate is that the higher-order principles of sound economic management do not 
map into unique institutional arrangements.   
 
In fact, principles such as appropriate incentives, property rights, sound money, 
and fiscal solvency all come institution-free.  We need to operationalize them through a 
set of policy actions.  The experiences above show us that there may be multiple ways of 
packing these principles into institutional arrangements.  Different packages have 
different costs and benefits depending on prevailing political constraints, levels of 
administrative competence, and market failures.  The pre-existing institutional landscape 
will typically offer both constraints and opportunities, requiring creative shortcuts or bold 
experiments.  From this perspective, the “art” of reform consists of selecting 
appropriately from a potentially infinite menu of institutional designs.  
 
A direct corollary of this line of argument is that there is only a weak 
correspondence between the higher-order principles of neoclassical economics and the 
specific policy recommendations in the standard list (as enumerated in Table 2).  To see 
this, consider for example one of the least contentious recommendations in the list, 
having to do with trade liberalization.  Can the statement “trade liberalization is good for 
economic performance” be derived from first principles of neoclassical economics?  Yes, 
but only if a number of side conditions are met:   
 
  The liberalization must be complete or else the reduction in import restrictions 
must take into account the potentially quite complicated structure of 
substitutability and complementarity across restricted commodities.
9   
  There must be no microeconomic market imperfections other than the trade 
restrictions in question, or if there are some, the second-best interactions that 
are entailed must not be adverse.
10   
  The home economy must be “small” in world markets, or else the 
liberalization must not put the economy on the wrong side of the “optimum 
tariff.”
11   
                                                 
9 There is a large theoretical literature on partial trade reform, which shows the difficulty of obtaining 
unambiguous characterizations of the welfare effects of incomplete liberalization.  See Hatta (1977), 
Anderson and Neary (1992), and Lopez and Panagariya (1993).  For an applied general equilibrium 
analysis of how these issues can complicate trade reform in practice, see Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 
(1993). 
 
10 For an interesting empirical illustration on how trade liberalization can interact adversely with 
environmental externalities, see Lopez (1997).   
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  The economy must be in reasonably full employment, or if not, the monetary 
and fiscal authorities must have effective tools of demand management at 
their disposal.   
  The income redistributive effects of the liberalization should not be judged 
undesirable by society at large, or if they are, there must be compensatory tax-
transfer schemes with low enough excess burden.
12   
  There must be no adverse effects on the fiscal balance, or if there are, there 
must be alternative and expedient ways of making up for the lost fiscal 
revenues.   
  The liberalization must be politically sustainable and hence credible so that 
economic agents do not fear or anticipate a reversal.
13   
 
All these theoretical complications could be sidestepped if there were convincing 
evidence that in practice trade liberalization systematically produces improved economic 
performance.  But even for this relatively uncontroversial policy, it has proved difficult to 




The point is that even the simplest of policy recommendations—“liberalize your 
trade”—is contingent on a large number of judgment calls about the economic and 
political context in which it is to be implemented.
15  Such judgment calls are often made 
implicitly.  Rendering them explicit has a double advantage: it warns us about the 
potential minefields that await the standard recommendations, and it stimulates creative 
thinking on alternatives (as in China) that can sidestep those minefields.  By contrast, 
when the policy recommendation is made unconditionally, as in the Washington 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 This is not a theoretical curiosum.  Gilbert and Varangis (2003) argue that the liberalization of cocoa 
exports in West African countries has depressed world cocoa prices, with most of the benefits being 
captured by consumers in developed countries.  
  
12 The standard workhorse model of international trade, the factor-endowments model and its associated 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, comes with sharp predictions on the distributional effects of import 
liberalization (the “magnification effect”).     
 
13 Calvo (1989) was the first to point out that lack of credibility acts as an intertemporal distortion.  See also 
Rodrik (1991). 
  
14 Recent empirical studies have begun to look for non-linear effects of trade liberalization.  In a study of 
India’s liberalization, Aghion et al. (2003) find that trade liberalization appears to have generated 
differentiated effects across Indian firms depending on prevailing industrial capabilities and labor market 
regulations.  Firms that were close to the technological frontier and in states with more “flexible” 
regulations responded positively while others responded negatively.  See also Helleiner (1994) for a useful 
collection of country studies that underscores the contingent nature of economies’ response to trade 
liberalization.   
 
15 This is one  reason why policy discussions on standard recommendations such as trade liberalization and 
privatization now often take the formulaic form: “policy x is not a panacea; in order to work, it must be 
supported by reforms in the areas of a, b, c, d, and so on.”   
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Consensus, the gamble is that the policy’s prerequisites will coincide with our actual 
draw from a potentially large universe of possible states of the world.   
 
I summarize this discussion with the help of Tables 6, 7, and 8 dealing with 
microeconomic policy, macroeconomic policy, and social policy, respectively.  Each 
table contains three columns.  The first column displays the ultimate goal that is targeted 
by the policies and institutional arrangements in the three domains.  Hence 
microeconomic policies aim to achieve static and dynamic efficiency in the allocation of 
resources.  Macroeconomic policies aim for macroeconomic and financial stability.  
Social policies target poverty reduction and social protection.   
 
The next column displays some of the key higher-order principles that economic 
analysis brings to the table.  Allocative efficiency require property rights, the rule of law, 
and appropriate incentives.  Macroeconomic and financial stability requires sound 
money, fiscal solvency, and prudential regulation.  Social inclusion requires incentive 
compatibility and appropriate targeting.  These are the “universal principles” of sound 
economic management.  They are universal in the sense that it is hard to see what any 
country would gain by systematically defying them.  Countries that have adhered to these 
principles—no matter how unorthodox their manner of doing so may have been—have 
done well while countries that have flouted them have typically done poorly.   
 
From the standpoint of policy makers, the trouble is that these universal principles 
are not operational as stated.  In effect, the answers to the real questions that preoccupy 
policy makers—how far should I go in opening up my economy to foreign competition, 
should I free up interest rates, should I rely on payroll taxes or the VAT, and the others 
listed in the third column of each table--cannot be directly deduced from these principles.  
This opens up space for a multiplicity of institutional arrangements that are compatible 
with the universal, higher-order principles.   
 
These tables clarify why the standard recommendations (Table 2) correlates 
poorly with economic performance around the world.  The Washington Consensus, in its 
various forms, has tended to blur the line that separates column 2 from column 3.  Policy 
advisors have been too quick in jumping from the higher-order principles in column 2 to 
taking unconditional stands on the specific operational questions posed in column 3.  And 
as their policy advice has yielded disappointing results, they have moved on to 
recommendations with even greater institutional specificity (as with “second generation 
reforms”).  As a result, sound economics has often been delivered in unsound form.   
 
I emphasize that this argument is not one about the advantages of gradualism over 
shock therapy.  In fact, the set of ideas I have presented are largely orthogonal to the 
long-standing debate between the adherents of the two camps (see for example Lipton 
and Sachs 1990, Aslund et al. 1996, Williamson and Zagha 2002).  The strategy of 
gradualism presumes that policy makers have a fairly good idea of the institutional 
arrangements that they want to acquire ultimately, but that for political and other reasons 
they can proceed only step-by-step in that direction.  The argument here is that there is 
typically a large amount of uncertainty about what those institutional arrangements are,   14
and therefore that the process that is required is more one of “search and discovery” than 
one of gradualism.  The two strategies may coincide when policy changes reveal 
information and small-scale policy reforms have a more favorable ratio of information 
revelation to risk of failure.
16  But it is best not to confuse the two strategies.  What stands 
out in the real success cases, as I will further illustrate below, is not gradualism per se but 
an unconventional mix of standard and non-standard policies well attuned to the reality 
on the ground.        
 
 
IV.  Back to the real world  
 
Previously we had asked our Martian to interpret economic performance in the 
real world from the lens of the standard reform agenda.  Suppose we now remove the 
constraint and ask him to summarize the stylized facts as he sees them.  Here is a list of 
four stylized facts that he may come up with. 
 
1. In practice, growth spurts are associated with a narrow range of policy reforms. 
 
  One of the most encouraging aspects of the comparative evidence on economic 
growth is that it often takes very little to get growth started.   To appreciate the point, it is 
enough to turn to Table 9, which lists 64 cases of growth transitions.  The table shows all 
cases of significant growth accelerations since the 1950s that can be identified 
statistically.  The definition of a growth acceleration is the following: an increase in an 
economy’s per-capita GDP growth of 2.5 percentage points or more (relative to the 
previous 5 years) that is sustained over at least 10 years.  The timing of the growth 
acceleration is determined by fitting a spline centered on the candidate break years, and 
selecting the break that maximizes the fit of the equation (see Hausmann, Pritchett, and 
Rodrik forthcoming, for details on the procedure).
17    
 
Most of the usual suspects are included in the table, for example Taiwan 1961, 
South Korea 1962, Botswana 1966, Brazil 1966, Singapore 1968, Mauritius 1969, China 
1978, Chile 1985 and so on.  But the exercise also yields a large number of much less 
well-known cases, such as Egypt 1976 or Pakistan 1977.  In fact, the large number of 
countries that have managed to engineer at least one instance of transition to high growth 
may appear as surprising.  As I will discuss later, most of these growth spurts have 
eventually collapsed.  Nonetheless, an increase in growth of 2.5 percent (and typically 
more) over a decade is nothing to sneer at, and it is worth asking what produces it.   
 
In the vast majority of the cases listed in Table 9, the “shocks” (policy or 
otherwise) that produced the growth spurts were apparently quite mild.  Asking most 
development economists about the policy reforms of Pakistan in 1977 or Syria in 1969 
                                                 
16 For example, Dewatripont and Roland (1995) and Wei (1997) present models in which gradual reforms 
reveal information and affect subsequent political constraints. 
 
17 The selection strategy allows multiple accelerations, but they must be at least five years apart.  
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would draw a blank stare.  This reflects the fact that not much reform was actually taking 
pace in these cases.  Relatively small changes in the background environment can yield 
significant increase in economic activity.   
 
Even in the well-known cases, policy changes at the outset have been typically 
modest.  The gradual, experimental steps towards liberalization that China undertook in 
the late 1970s were discussed above.  South Korea’s experience in the early 1960s was 
similar.  The military government led by Park Chung Hee that took power in 1961 did not 
have strong views on economic reform, except that it regarded economic development as 
its key priority.  It moved in a trial-and-error fashion, experimenting at first with various 
public investment projects.  The hallmark reforms associated with the Korean miracle, 
the devaluation of the currency and the rise in interest rates, came in 1964 and fell far 
short of full liberalization of currency and financial markets.  As these instances 
illustrate, an attitudinal change on the part of the top political leadership towards a more 
market-oriented, private-sector-friendly policy framework often plays as large a role as 
the scope of policy reform itself (if not larger).  Such an attitudinal change appears to 
have had a particularly important effect in India in the early 1980s (de Long 2003).       
 
This is good news because it suggests countries do not need an extensive set of 
institutional reforms in order to start growing.  Instigating growth is a lot easier in 
practice than the standard recipe, with its long list of action items, would lead us to 
believe.  This should not be surprising from a growth theory standpoint.  When a country 
is so far below its potential steady-state level of income, even moderate movements in the 
right direction can produce a big growth payoff.  Nothing could be more encouraging to 
policy makers, who are often overwhelmed and paralyzed by the apparent need to 
undertake policy reforms on a wide and ever-expanding front.     
 
2.  The policy reforms that are associated with these growth transitions typically combine 
elements of orthodoxy with unorthodox institutional practices. 
 
No country has experienced rapid growth without minimal adherence to what I 
have termed higher-order principles of sound economic governance—property rights, 
market-oriented incentives, sound money, fiscal solvency.  But as I have already argued, 
these principles were often implemented via policy arrangements that are quite 
unconventional.  I illustrated this using examples such as China’s two-track reform 
strategy, Mauritius’ export processing zone, and South Korea’s system of “financial 
restraint.”   
 
It is easy to multiply the examples.  When Taiwan and South Korea decided to 
reform their trade regimes to reduce anti-export bias, they did this not via import 
liberalization (which would have been a Western economist’s advice) but through 
selective subsidization of exports.  When Singapore decided to make itself more 
attractive to foreign investment, it did this not by reducing state intervention but by 
greatly expanding public investment in the economy and through generous tax incentives 
(Young 1992).  Botswana, which has an admirable record with respect to macroeconomic 
stability and the management of its diamond wealth, also has one of the largest levels of   16
government spending (in relation to GDP) in the world.  Chile, a country that is often 
cited as a paragon of virtue by the standard check list, has also departed from it in some 
important ways: it has kept its largest export industry (copper) under state ownership; it 
has maintained capital controls on financial inflows through the 1990s; and it has 
provided significant technological, organizational, and marketing assistance to its 
fledgling agro-industries.         
 
In all these instances, standard desiderata such as market liberalization and 
outward orientation were combined with public intervention and selectivity of some sort.  
The former element in the mix ensures that any economist so inclined can walk away 
from the success cases with a renewed sense that the standard policy recommendations 
really “work.”  Most egregiously, China’s success is often attributed to its turn towards 
market—which is largely correct—and then with an unjustified leap of logic is taken as a 
vindication of the standard recipe—which is largely incorrect.  It is not clear how helpful 
such evaluations are when so much of what these countries did is unconventional and fits 
poorly with the standard agenda.
18   
 
It is difficult to identify cases of high growth where unorthodox elements have not 
played a role.  Hong Kong is probably the only clear-cut case.  Hong Kong’s government 
has had a hands-off attitude towards the economy in almost all areas, the housing market 
being a major exception.  Unlike Singapore, which followed a free trade policy but 
otherwise undertook extensive industrial policies, Hong Kong’s policies have been as 
close to laissez-faire as we have ever observed.  However, there were important 
prerequisites to Hong Kong’s success, which illuminate once again the context-
specificity of growth strategies.  Most important, Hong Kong’s important entrepôt role in 
trade, the strong institutions imparted by the British, and the capital flight from 
communist China had already transformed the city-state into a high investment, high 
entrepreneurship economy by the late 1950s.  As Figure 3 shows, during the early 1960s 
Hong Kong’s investment rate was more than three times higher than that in South Korea 
or Taiwan.  The latter two economies would not reach Hong Kong’s 1960 per-capita 
GDP until the early 1970s.
19  Hence Hong Kong did not face the same challenge that 
Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore did to crowd in private investment and stimulate 
entrepreneurship.   
 
It goes without saying that not all unorthodox remedies work.  And those that 
work sometimes do so only for a short while.  Consider for example Argentina’s 
experiment in the 1990s with a currency board.  Most economists would consider a 
currency board regime as too risky for an economy of Argentina’s size insofar as it 
prevents expenditure switching via the exchange rate.  (Hong Kong has long operated a 
                                                 
18 Another source of confusion is the mixing up of policies with outcomes.  Successful countries end up 
with much greater participation in the world economy, thriving private sectors, and a lot of financial 
intermediation.  What we need to figure out, however, are the policies that produce these results.  It would 
be a great distortion of the strategy followed by countries such as China, South Korea, Taiwan and others to 
argue that these outcomes were the result of trade and financial liberalization, and privatization.   
     
19 These and investment data are from the Penn World Tables 6.1. 
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successful marketing board.)   However, as the Argentinean economy began to grow 
rapidly in the first half of the 1990s, many analysts altered their views.  Had the Asian 
crisis of 1997-98 and the Brazilian devaluation of 1999 not forced Argentina off its 
currency board, it would have been easy to construct a story ex post about the virtues of 
the currency board as a growth strategy.  The currency board sought to counteract the 
effects of more than a century of financial mismanagement through monetary discipline.   
It was a shortcut aimed at convincing foreign and domestic investors that the rules of the 
game had changed irrevocably.  Under better external circumstances, the credibility 
gained might have more than offset the disadvantages.  The problem in this case was the 
unwillingness to pull back from the experiment even when it became clear that the 
regime had left the Argentine economy with a hopelessly uncompetitive real exchange 
rate.  Institutional innovation requires a pragmatic approach that avoids ideological lock-
in.        
 
3.  Institutional innovations do not travel well.   
 
  The more discouraging aspect of the stylized facts is that the policy packages 
associated with growth accelerations—and particularly the elements therein that are non-
standard—tend to vary considerably from country to country.  China’s two-track strategy 
of reform differs significantly from India’s gradualism.  South Korea’s and Taiwan’s 
more protectionist trade strategy differs markedly from the open trade policies of 
Singapore (and Hong Kong).  Even within strategies that look superficially similar, closer 
look reveals large variation.  Taiwan and South Korea both subsidized non-traditional 
industrial activities, but the former did it through tax incentives and the latter through 
directed credit.
20   
 
Attempts to emulate successful policies elsewhere often fail.  When Gorbachev 
tried to institute a system similar to China’s Household Responsibility System and two-
track pricing in the Soviet Union during the mid- to late-1980s, it produced few of the 
beneficial results that China had obtained.
21  Most developing countries have export 
processing zones of one kind or another, but few have been as successful as the one in 
Mauritius.  Import-substituting industrialization (ISI) worked in Brazil, but not in 
Argentina.
22   
 
In light of the arguments made earlier, this experience should not be altogether 
surprising.  Successful reforms are those that package sound economic principles around 
local capabilities, constraints and opportunities.  Since these local circumstances vary, so 
do the reforms that work.  An immediate implication is that growth strategies require 
                                                 
20 On the institutional differences among East Asian economies, see Haggard (2003). 
 
21 Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) analyze this failure and attribute it to the inability of the Soviet 
state to enforce the plan quotas once market pricing was allowed (albeit at the margin).  This had been 
critical to the success of the Chinese approach.  
 
22 TFP growth averaged 2.9 and 0.2 percent per annum in Brazil and Argentina, respectively, during 1960-
73.  See Rodrik (1999) and Collins and Bosworth (1996).   
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considerable local knowledge.  It does not take a whole lot of reform to stimulate 
economic growth—that is the good news.  The bad news is that it may be quite difficult 
to identify where the binding constraints or promising opportunities lie.  A certain 
amount of policy experimentation may be required in order to discover what will work.  
China represents the apotheosis of this experimental approach to reform.  But it is worth 
noting that many other instances of successful reform were preceded by failed 
experiments.  In South Korea, President Park’s developmental efforts initially focused on 
the creation of white elephant industrial projects that ultimately went nowhere (Soon 
1994, 27-28).  In Chile, Pinochet’s entire first decade can be viewed as a failed 
experiment in “global monetarism.” 
 
Economists can have a useful role to play in this process:  they can identify the 
sources of inefficiency, describe the relevant trade offs, figure out general-equilibrium 
implications, predict behavioral responses, and so on.  But they can do these well only if 
their analysis is adequately embedded within the prevailing institutional and political 
reality.  The hard work needs to be done at home.    
 
4.  Sustaining growth is more difficult than igniting it, and requires more extensive 
institutional reform.   
 
The main reason that few of the growth accelerations listed in Table 9 are etched 
in the consciousness of development economists is that most of them did not prove 
durable.  In fact, as discussed earlier, over the last four decades few countries except for a 
few East Asian ones have steadily converged to the income levels of the rich countries.  
The vast majority of growth spurts tend to run out of gas after a while.  The experience of 
Latin America since the early 1980s and the even more dramatic collapse of Sub-Saharan 
Africa are emblematic of this phenomenon.  In a well-known paper, Easterly, Kremer, 
Pritchett and Summers (1993) were the first to draw attention to a related finding, namely 
the variability in growth performance across time periods.  The same point is made on a 
broader historical canvas by Goldstone (forthcoming).   
 
Hence growth in the short-term does not guarantee success in the long-term.  A 
plausible interpretation is that the initial reforms need to be deepened over time with 
efforts aimed at strengthening the institutional underpinning of market economies.  It 
would be nice if a small number of policy changes—which, as argued above, is what 
produces growth accelerations—could produce growth over the longer term as well, but 
this is obviously unrealistic.  I will discuss some of the institutional prerequisites of 
sustained growth in greater detail later in the paper.  But the key to longer-term 
prosperity, once growth is launched, is to develop institutions that maintain productive 
dynamism and generate resilience to external shocks.   
 
For example, the growth collapses experienced by many developing countries in 
the period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s seem to be related mainly to the 
inability to adjust to the volatility exhibited by the external environment at that time.  In 
these countries, the effects of terms-of-trade and interest-rate shocks were magnified by 
weak institutions of conflict management (Rodrik 1999b).  The required macroeconomic   19
policy adjustments set off distributive struggles and proved difficult to undertake.  The 
weakness of Indonesia’s institutions explains why that country could not extricate itself 
from the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis (see Temple 2003), while South Korea, for 
example, did a rapid turnaround.  These examples are also a warning that continued 
growth in China cannot be taken for granted: without stronger institutions in areas 
ranging from financial markets to political governance, the Chinese economy may well 
find itself having outgrown its institutional underpinnings.
23    
 
 
V.  A two-pronged growth strategy 
 
As the evidence discussed above reveals, growth accelerations are feasible with 
minimal institutional change.  The deeper and more extensive institutional reforms 
needed for long-term convergence take time to implement and mature.  And they may not 
be the most effective way to raise growth at the outset because they do not directly target 
the most immediate constraints and opportunities facing an economy.  At the same time, 
such institutional reforms can be much easier to undertake in an environment of growth 
rather than stagnation.  These considerations suggest that successful growth strategies are 
based on a two-pronged effort: a short-run strategy aimed at stimulating growth, and a 
medium- to long-run strategy aimed at sustaining growth.
24  The rest of this section takes 
these up in turn.   
 
1.  An investment strategy to kick-start growth  
 
From the standpoint of economic growth, the most important question in the short 
run for an economy stuck in a low-activity equilibrium is: how do you get entrepreneurs 
excited about investing in the home economy?  “Invest” here has to be interpreted 
broadly, as referring to all the activities that entrepreneurs undertake, such as expanding 
capacity, employing new technology, producing new products, searching for new 
markets, and so on.  As entrepreneurs become energized, capital accumulation and 
technological change are likely to go hand in hand—too entangled with each other to 
separate out cleanly.   
 
What sets this process into motion?  There are two kinds of views on this in the 
literature.  One approach emphasizes the role of government-imposed barriers to 
entrepreneurship.  In this view, policy biases towards large and politically-connected 
firms, institutional failures (in the form of licensing and other regulatory barriers, 
inadequate property rights and contract enforcement), and high levels of policy 
uncertainty and risk create dualistic economic structures and repress entrepreneurship.  
                                                 
23 Young (2000) argues that China’s reform strategy may have made things worse in the long run, by 
increasing the number of distorted margins.   
 
24 A similar distinction is also made by Ocampo (2003), who emphasizes that many of the long-run 
correlates of growth (such as improved institutions) are the result, and not the instigator, of growth.  There 
is also an analogue in the political science literature in the distinction between the political prerequisites of 
initiating and sustaining reform (see Haggard and Kaufman 1983).   
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The removal of the most egregious forms of these impediments is then expected to 
unleash a flurry of new investments and entrepreneurship.  According to the second view, 
the government has to play a more pro-active role than simply getting out of the private 
sector’s way: it needs to find means of crowding in investment and entrepreneurship with 
some positive inducements.  In this view, economic growth is not the natural order of 
things, and establishing a fair and level playing field may not be enough to spur 
productive dynamism.  The two views differ in the importance they attach to prevailing, 
irremovable market imperfections and their optimism with regard to governments’ ability 
to design and implement appropriate policy interventions.   
 
(a) Government failures  
 
A good example of the first view is provided by the strategy of development 
articulated in Stern (2001).  In a deliberate evocation of Hirschman’s The Strategy of 
Economic Development (1958), Stern outlines an approach with two pillars: building an 
appropriate “investment climate” and “empowering poor people.”  The former is the 
relevant part of his approach in this context.  Stern defines “investment climate” quite 
broadly, as “the policy, institutional, and behavioral environment, both present and 
expected, that influences the returns and risks associated with investment” (2001, 144-
45).  At the same time, he recognizes the need for priorities and the likelihood that these 
priorities will be context specific.  He emphasizes the favorable dynamics that are 
unleashed once a few, small things are done right.   
 
In terms of actual policy content, Stern’s illustrations make clear that he views the 
most salient features of the investment climate to be government-imposed imperfections: 
macroeconomic instability and high inflation, high government wages that distort the 
functioning of labor markets, a large tax burden, arbitrary regulations, burdensome 
licensing requirements, corruption, and so on.  The strategy he recommends is to use 
enterprise surveys and other techniques to uncover which of these problems bite the most, 
and then to focus reforms on the corresponding margin.  Similar perspectives can be 
found in Johnson et al. (2000), Friedman et al. (2000), and Aslund and Johnson (2003).  
Besley and Burgess (2002) provide evidence across Indian states on the productivity 
depressing effects of labor market regulations.  The title of Shleifer and Vishny’s (1998) 
book aptly summarizes the nature of the relevant constraint in this view:  The Grabbing 
Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures.    
 
(b) Market failures 
 
The second approach focuses not on government-imposed constraints, but on 
market imperfections inherent in low-income environments that block investment and 
entrepreneurship in non-traditional activities.  In this view, economies can get stuck in a 
low-level equilibrium due to the nature of technology and markets, even when 
government policy does not penalize entrepreneurship. There are many versions of this 
latter approach, and some of the main arguments are summarized in the taxonomy 
presented in Table 10.  I distinguish here between stories that are based on learning 
spillovers (a non-pecuniary externality) and those that are based on market-size   21
externalities induced by scale economies.  See also the useful discussion of these issues 
in Ocampo (2003), which takes a more overtly structuralist perspective.   
 
As Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002) point out, two types of learning are 
relevant to economic growth: (a) adaptation of existing technologies; and (b) innovation 
to create new technologies.  Early in the development process, the kind of learning that 
matters the most is of the first type.  There are a number of reasons why such learning 
can be subject to spillovers.  There may be a threshold level of human capital beyond 
which the private return to acquiring skills becomes strongly positive (as in Azariadis and 
Drazen 1990).  There may be learning-by-doing which is either external to individual 
firms, or cannot be properly internalized due to imperfections in the market for credit (as 
in Matsuyama 1992).  Or there may be learning about a country’s own cost structure, 
which spills over from the incumbents to later entrants (as in Hausmann and Rodrik 
2002).  In all these cases, the relevant learning is under-produced in a decentralized 
equilibrium, with the consequence that the economy fails to diversify into non-traditional, 
more advanced lines of activity.
25  There then exist policy interventions that can improve 
matters.  With standard externalities, the first-best takes the form of a corrective subsidy 
targeted at the relevant distorted margin.  In practice, revenue, administrative or 
informational constraints may make resort to second-best interventions inevitable. 
 
For example, Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) suggest a carrot-and-stick strategy to 
deal with the learning barrier to industrialization that they identify.  In that model, costs 
of production in non-traditional activities are uncertain, and they are revealed only after 
an upfront investment by an incumbent.  Once that initial investment is made, the cost 
information becomes public knowledge.  Entrepreneurs engaged in the cost discovery 
process incur private costs, but provide social benefits that can vastly exceed their 
anticipated profits.  The first-best policy here, which is an entry subsidy, suffers from an 
inextricable moral hazard problem.  Subsidized entrants have little incentive to engage 
subsequently in costly activities to discover costs.  A second-best approach takes the form 
of incentives contingent on good performance.  Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) evaluate 
East Asian and Latin American industrial policies from this perspective.  They argue that 
East Asian policies were superior in that they effectively combined incentives with 
discipline.  The former was provided through subsidies and protection, while the latter 
was provided through government monitoring and the use of export performance as a 
productivity yardstick.  Latin American firms under import substituting industrialization 
(ISI) received considerable incentives, but faced very little discipline.  In the 1990s, these 
same firms arguably faced lots of discipline (exerted through foreign competition), but 
little incentives.  This line of argument provides one potential clue to the disappointing 
economic performance of Latin America in the 1990s despite a much improved 
“investment climate” according to the standard criteria.     
                                                 
25 Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) demonstrate that sectoral diversification is a robust correlate of economic 
growth at lower levels of income.  This is in tension with standard models of trade and specialization under 
constant returns to scale.  Sectoral concentration starts to increase only after a relatively high level of 
income is reached, with the turning point coming somewhere between $8,500 and $9,500 in 1985 U.S. 
dollars.   
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The second main group of stories shown in Table 10 relates to the existence of 
coordination failures induced by scale economies.  The big-push theory of development, 
articulated first by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and formalized by Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989), is based on the idea that moving out of a low-level steady state requires 
coordinated and simultaneous investments in a number of different areas.  A general 
formulation of such models can provided as follows.  Let the level of profits in a given 
modern-sector activity depend on n, the proportion of the economy that is already 
engaged in modern activities:  π
m(n), with dπ
m(n)/dn > 0 .  Let profits in traditional 
activities be denoted π
t.  Suppose modern activities are unprofitable for an individual 
entrant if no other entrepreneur already operates in the modern sector, but highly 
profitable if enough entrepreneurs do so: π
m(0) < π
t  and π
m(1) > π
t .  Then n = 0 and n = 1 
are both possible equilibria, and industrialization may never take hold in an economy that 
starts with n = 0.  The precise mechanism that generates profit functions of this form 
depends on the model in question.  Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) develop models 
in which the complementarity arises from demand spillovers across final goods produced 
under scale economies or from bulky infrastructure investments.  Rodriguez-Clare 
(1996), Rodrik (1996), and Trindade (2003) present models in which the effect operates 
through vertical industry relationships and specialized intermediate inputs.  Hoff and 
Stiglitz (2001) discuss a large class of models with coordination failure characteristics.      
 
The policy implications of such models can be quite unconventional, requiring the 
crowding in of private investment through subsidization, jawboning, public enterprises 
and the like.  Despite the “big push” appellation, the requisite policies need not be wide-
ranging.  For example, socializing investment risk through implicit investment 
guarantees, a policy followed in South Korea, is welfare enhancing in Rodrik’s (1996) 
framework because it induces simultaneous entry into the modern sector.  It is also 
costless to the government, because the guarantees are never called on insofar as the 
resulting investment boom pays for itself.  Hence, when successful, such policies will 
leave little trail on government finances or elsewhere.
26       
 
  Both types of models listed in Table 10 suggest that the propagation of modern, 
non-traditional activities is not a natural process and that it may require positive 
inducements.  One such inducement that has often worked in the past is a sizable and 
sustained depreciation of the real exchange rate.  For a small open economy, the real 
exchange rate is defined as the relative price of tradables to non-tradables.  In practice, 
this price ratio tends to move in tandem with the nominal exchange rate, the price of 
foreign currency in terms of home currency.  Hence currency devaluations (supported by 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policies) increase the profitably of tradable activities 
across the board.  From the current perspective, this has a number of distinct advantages.  
Most of the gains from diversification into non-traditional activities are likely to lie 
within manufactures and natural resource based products (i.e., tradables) rather than 
                                                 
26 On South Korea’s implicit investment guarantees, see Amsden (1989).  During the Asian financial crisis, 
these guarantees became an issue and they were portrayed as evidence of crony capitalism (MacLean 
1999). 
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services and other non-tradables.  Second, the magnitude of the inducement can be quite 
large, since sustained real depreciations of 50 percent or more are quite common.  Third, 
since tradable activities face external competition, the activities that are encouraged tend 
to be precisely the ones that face the greatest market discipline.  Fourth, the manner in 
which currency depreciation subsidizes tradable activities is completely market-friendly, 
requiring no micromanagement on the part of bureaucrats.  For all these reasons, a 
credible, sustained real exchange rate depreciation may constitute the most effective 
industrial policy there is.     
 
  Large real exchange rate changes have played a big role in some of the more 
recent growth accelerations.  Figure 4 shows two well-known cases: Chile and Uganda 
since the mid-1980s.  In both cases, a substantial swing in relative prices in favor of 
tradables accompanied the growth take-off.  In Chile, the more than doubling of the real 
exchange rate following the crisis of 1982-83 (the deepest in Latin America at the time) 
is commonly presumed to have played an instrumental role in promoting diversification 
into non-traditional exports and stimulating economic growth. It is worth noting that 
import tariffs were raised significantly as well (during 1982-85), giving import-
substituting activities an additional boost.  As the bottom panel of Figure 3 shows, the 
depreciation In Uganda was even larger.  These depreciations are unlikely to have been 
the result of growth, since growth typically generates an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate through the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  By contrast, large real depreciations did not 
play a major role in early growth accelerations in East Asia during the 1960s (Rodrik 
1997).
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(c)  Where to start? 
 
The two sets of views outlined above—the government failure and market failure 
approaches—can help frame policy discussions and identify important ways of thinking 
about policy priorities in the short run.  The most effective point of leverage for 
stimulating growth obviously depends on local circumstances.  It is tempting to think that 
the right first step is to remove government-imposed obstacles to entrepreneurial activity 
before worrying about “crowding in” investments through positive inducements.  But this 
may not always be a better strategy.  Certainly when inflation is in triple digits or the 
regulatory framework is so cumbersome that it stifles any private initiative, removing 
these distortions will be the most sensible initial step.  But beyond that, it is difficult to 
say in general where the most effective margin for change lies.  Asking businessmen their 
views on the priorities can be helpful, but not decisive.  When learning spillovers and 
coordination failures block economic take-off, enterprise surveys are unlikely to be 
revealing unless the questions are very carefully crafted to elicit relevant responses.   
 
One of the lessons of recent economic history is that creative interventions can be 
remarkably effective even when the “investment climate,” judged by standard criteria, is 
pretty lousy.  South Korea’s early reforms took place against the background of a 
                                                 
27 Polterovich and Popov (2002) provide theory and evidence on the role of real exchange rate 
undervaluations in generating economic growth. 
   24
political leadership that was initially quite hostile to the entrepreneurial class.
28  China’s 
TVEs have been stunningly successful despite the absence of private property rights and 
an effective judiciary.  Conversely, the Latin American experience of the 1990s indicates 
that the standard criteria do not guarantee an appropriate investment climate.  
Governments can certainly deter entrepreneurship when they try to do too much; but they 
can also deter entrepreneurship when they do too little. 
 
It is sometimes argued that heterodoxy requires greater institutional strength and 
therefore lies out of reach of most developing countries.  But the evidence does not 
provide much support for this view.  It is true that the selective interventions I have 
discussed in the case of South Korea and Taiwan were successful in part due to unusual 
and favorable circumstances.  But elsewhere, heterodoxy served to make virtue out of 
institutional weakness.  This is the case with China’s TVEs, Mauritius’ export processing 
zone, and India’s gradualism.  In these countries, it was precisely institutional weakness 
that rendered the standard remedies impractical.  It is in part because the standard reform 
agenda is institutionally so highly demanding—a fact now recognized through so-called 
“second generation reforms”—that successful growth strategies are so often based on 
unconventional elements (in their early stages at least).   
 
It is nonetheless true that the implementation of the market failure approach 
requires a reasonably competent and non-corrupt government.  For every South Korea, 
there are many Zaires where policy activism is an excuse for politicians to steal and 
plunder.  Finely-tuned policy interventions can hardly be expected to produce desirable 
outcomes in setting such as the latter.  And to the extent that Washington Consensus 
policies are more conducive to honest behavior on the part of politicians, they may well 
be preferable on this account.  However, the evidence is ambiguous on this.  Most 
policies, including those of the Washington Consensus type, are corruptible if the 
underlying political economy permits or encourages it.  Consider for example Russia’s 
experiment with mass privatization.  It is widely accepted that this process was distorted 
and de-legitimized by asset grabs on the part of politically well-connected insiders.  
Washington Consensus policies themselves cannot legislate powerful rent-seekers out of 
existence.  Rank ordering different policy regimes requires a more fully specified model 
of political economy than the reduced-form view that automatically associates 
governmental restraint with less rent-seeking.
29   
 
                                                 
28 One month after taking power in a military coup in 1961, President Park arrested some of the leading 
businessmen in Korea under the newly passed Law for Dealing with Illicit Wealth Accumulation.  These 
businessmen were subsequently set free under the condition that they establish new industrial firms and 
give up the shares to the government (Amsden 1989, 72). 
  
29 In Rodrik (1995) I compared export subsidy regimes in six countries, and found that the regimes that 
were least likely to be open to rent-seeking ex ante—those with clear-cut rules, uniform schedules, and no 
arms’ length relationships between firms and bureaucrats—were in fact less effective ex post.  Where 
bureaucrats were professional and well-monitored, discretion was not harmful.  Where they were not, the 
rules did not help.     
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I close this section with the usual refrain: the range of strategies that have worked 
in the past is quite diverse.  Traditional import-substituting industrialization (ISI) model 
was quite effective in stimulating growth in a large number of developing countries (e.g., 
Brazil, Mexico, Turkey).  So was East Asian style outward orientation, which combined 
heavy-handed interventionism at home with single-minded focus on exports (South 
Korea, Taiwan).  Chile’s post-1983 strategy was based on quite a different style of 
outward orientation, relying on large real depreciation, absence of explicit industrial 
policies (but quite a bit of support for non-traditional exports in agro-industry), saving 
mobilization through pension privatization, and discouragement of short-term capital 
inflows.  The experience of countries such as China and Mauritius is best described as 
two-track reform.  India comes as close to genuine gradualism as one can imagine.  Hong 
Kong represents probably the only case where growth has taken place without an active 
policy of crowding in private investment and entrepreneurship, but here too special and 
favorable preconditions (mentioned earlier) limit its relevance to other settings.  In view 
of this diversity, any statement on what ignites growth has to be cast at a sufficiently high 
level of generality.       
 
2.  An institution building strategy to sustain growth 
 
In the long run, the main thing that ensures convergence with the living standards 
of advanced countries is the acquisition of high-quality institutions.  The growth-spurring 
strategies described above have to be complemented over time with a cumulative process 
of institution building to ensure that growth does not run out of steam and that the 
economy remains resilient to shocks.  This point has now been amply demonstrated both 
by historical accounts (North and Thomas 1973, Engerman and Sokoloff 1994) and by 
econometric studies (Hall and Jones 1999, Acemoglu et al. 2001, Rodrik et al., 2002, 
Easterly and Levine, 2002).  However, these studies tend to remain at a very aggregate 
level of generality and do not provide much policy guidance (a point that is also made in 
Besley and Burgess 2002b).      
 
The empirical research on national institutions has generally focused on the 
protection of property rights and the rule of law.  But one should think of institutions 
along a much wider spectrum.  In its broadest definition, institutions are the prevailing 
rules of the game in society (North 1990).  High quality institutions are those that induce 
socially desirable behavior on the part of economic agents.  Such institutions can be both 
informal (e.g., moral codes, self-enforcing agreements) and formal (legal rules enforced 
through third parties).  It is widely recognized that the relative importance of formal 
institutions increases as the scope of market exchange broadens and deepens.  One reason 
is that setting up formal institutions requires high fixed costs but low marginal costs, 
whereas informal institutions have high marginal costs (Li 1999; Dixit 2004, chap. 3).  I 
will focus here on formal institutions.      
 
  What kind of institutions matter and why?  Table 11 provides a taxonomy of 
market-sustaining institutions, associating each type of institutions with a particular need.  
The starting point is the recognition that markets need not be self-creating, self-
regulating, self-stabilizing, and self-legitimizing.  Hence, the very existence of market   26
exchange presupposes property rights and some form of contract enforcement.  This is 
the aspect of institutions that has received the most scrutiny in empirical work.  The 
central dilemma here is that a political entity that is strong enough to establish property 
rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough, by definition, to violate these same 
rules for its own purpose (Djankov et al., 2003).  The relevant institutions must strike the 
right balance between disorder and dictatorship.   
 
As Table 11 makes clear, there are other needs as well.  Every advanced economy 
has discovered that markets require extensive regulation to minimize abuse of market 
power, internalize externalities, deal with information asymmetries, establish product and 
safety standards, and so on.  They also need monetary, fiscal, and other arrangements to 
deal with the business cycle and the problems of unemployment/inflation that are at the 
center of macroeconomists’ analyses since Keynes.  Finally, market outcomes need to be 
legitimized through social protection, social insurance, and democratic governance most 
broadly (Rodrik 2000).   
 
Institutional choices made in dealing with these challenges often have to strike a 
balance between competing objectives.  The regulatory regime governing the 
employment relationship must trade off the gains from “flexibility” against the benefits of 
stability and predictability.  The corporate governance regime must delineate the interests 
and prerogatives of shareholders and stakeholders.  The financial system must be free to 
take risks, but not so much so that it becomes an implicit public liability.  There must be 
enough competition to ensure static allocative efficiency, but also adequate prospect of 
rents to spur innovation.   
 
The last two centuries of economic history in today’s rich countries can be 
interpreted as an ongoing process of learning how render capitalism more productive by 
supplying the institutional ingredients of a self-sustaining market economy: meritocratic 
public bureaucracies, independent judiciaries, central banking, stabilizing fiscal policy, 
antitrust and regulation, financial supervision, social insurance, political democracy.  Just 
as it is silly to think of these as the prerequisites of economic growth in poor countries, it 
is equally silly not to recognize that such institutions eventually become necessary to 
achieve full economic convergence.  In this connection, one may want to place special 
emphasis on democratic institutions and civil liberties, not only because they are 
important in and of themselves, but also because they can be viewed as meta-institutions 
that help society make appropriate selections from the available menu of economic 
institutions.         
 
  However, the earlier warning not to confuse institutional function and institutional 
form becomes once again relevant here.  Appropriate regulation, social insurance, 
macroeoconomic stability and the like can be provided through diverse institutional 
arrangements.  While one can be sure that some types of arrangements are far worse than 
others, it is also the case that many well-performing arrangements are functional 
equivalents.  Function does not map uniquely into form.  It would be hard to explain 
otherwise how social systems that are so different in their institutional details as those of 
the United States, Japan, and Europe have managed to generate roughly similar levels of   27
wealth for their citizens.  All these societies protect property rights, regulate product, 
labor, and financial markets, have sound money, and provide for social insurance.  But 
the rules of the game that prevail in the American style of capitalism are very different 
from those in the Japanese style of capitalism.  Both differ from the European style.  And 
even within Europe, there are large differences between the institutional arrangements in, 
say, Sweden and Germany.  There has been only modest convergence among these 
arrangements in recent years, with the greatest amount of convergence taking place 
probably in financial market practices and the least in labor market institutions (Freeman 
2000).    
 
  There are a number of reasons for institutional non-convergence.  First, 
differences in social preferences, say over the tradeoff between equity and opportunity, 
may result in different institutional choices.  If Europeans have a much greater preference 
for stability and equity than Americans, their labor market and welfare-state 
arrangements will reflect that preference.  Second, complementarities among different 
parts of the institutional landscape can generate hysteresis and path dependence.  An 
example of this would be the complementarity between corporate governance and 
financial market practices of the Japanese “model,” as discussed previously.  Third, the 
institutional arrangements that are required to promote economic development can differ 
significantly, both between rich and poor countries and among poor countries.  This too 
has been discussed previously.          
 
  There is increasing recognition in the economics literature that high-quality 
institutions can take a multitude of forms and that economic convergence need not 
necessarily entail convergence in institutional forms (North 1994, Freeman 2000, Pistor 
2000, Mukand and Rodrik 2002, Berkowitz et al. 2003, Djankov et al. 2003, Dixit 
2004).
30  North (1994, 8) writes:  “economies that adopt the formal rules of another 
economy will have very different performance characteristics than the first economy 
because of different informal norms and enforcement [with the implication that] 
transferring the formal political and economic rules of successful Western economies to 
third-world and Eastern European economies is not a sufficient condition for good 
economic performance.”  Freeman (2000) discusses the variety of labor market 
institutions that prevail among the advanced countries and argues that differences in these 
practices have first-order distributional effects, but only second-order efficiency effects.  
Pistor (2000) provides a general treatment of the issue of legal transplantation, and shows 
how importation of laws can backfire.  In related work, Berkowitz et al. (2003) find that 
countries that developed their formal legal orders internally, adapted imported codes to 
local conditions, or had familiarity with foreign codes ended up with much better legal 
institutions than those that simply transplanted formal legal orders from abroad.  Djankov 
et al. (2003) base their discussion on an “institutional possibility frontier” that describes 
the tradeoff between private disorder and dictatorship, and argue that different 
circumstances may call for different choices along this frontier.  And Dixit (2004, 4) 
                                                 
30 Furthermore, as Roberto Unger (1998) has argued, there is no reason to suppose that today’s advanced 
economies have already exhausted all the useful institutional variations that could underpin healthy and 
vibrant economies.   
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summarizes the lessons for developing countries thus: “it is not always necessary to 
create replicas of western style state legal institutions from scratch; it may be possible to 
work with such alternative institutions as are available, and build on them.”   
 
Mukand and Rodrik (2002) develop a formal model to examine the costs and 
benefits of institutional “experimentation” versus “copycatting” when formulas that have 
proved successful elsewhere may be unsuitable at home.  A key idea is that institutional 
arrangements that prove successful in one country create both positive and negative 
spillovers for other countries.  On the positive side, countries whose underlying 
conditions are sufficiently similar to those of the successful “leaders” can imitate the 
arrangements prevailing there and forego the costs of experimentation.  This is one 
interpretation of the relative success that transition economies in the immediate vicinity 
of the European Union have experienced.   Countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic 
or the Baltic republics share a similar historical trajectory with the rest of Europe, have 
previous experience with capitalist market institutions, and envisaged full EU 
membership within a reasonable period (de Menil 2003).  The wholesale adoption of 
EU’s acquis communautaire may have been the appropriate institution-building strategy 
for these countries.  On the other hand, countries may be tempted or forced to imitate 
institutional arrangements for political or other reasons, even when their underlying 
conditions are too dissimilar for the strategy to make sense.
31  Institutional copycatting 
may have been useful for Poland, but it is much less clear that it was relevant or practical 
for Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan.  The negative gradient in the economic performance of 
transition economies as one moves away from Western Europe provides some support for 
this idea (see Mukand and Rodrik 2002). 
 
  Even though it is recent, this literature opens up a new and exciting way of 
looking at institutional reform.  In particular, it promises an approach that is less focused 
on so-called best practices or the superiority of any particular model of capitalism, and 
more cognizant of the context-specificity of desirable institutional arrangements.  Dixit’s 
(2004) monograph outlines a range of theoretical models that help structure our thinking 
along these lines.      
 
 
VI.  Concluding remarks       
 
Richard Feynman, the irreverent physicist who won the Nobel Prize in 1965 for 
his work on quantum electrodynamics, relates the following story.  Following the award 
ceremony and the dinner in Stockholm, he wanders into a room where a Scandinavian 
princess is holding court.  The princess recognizes him as one of the awardees and asks 
him what he got the prize for.  When Feynman replies that his field is physics, the 
                                                 
31 In Mukand and Rodrik (2002) it is domestic politics that generates inefficient imitation.  Political leaders 
may want to signal their type (and increase the probability of remaining in power) by imitating standard 
policies even when they know these will not work as well as alternative arrangements.  But one can also 
appeal to the role of IMF and World Bank conditionality in producing this kind of outcome.  
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princess says that this is too bad.  Since no one at the table knows anything about physics, 
she says, they cannot talk about it.  Feynman disagrees:   
 
 “On the contrary,” I answered.  “It’s because somebody knows something about 
it that we can’t talk about physics.  It’s the things that nobody knows anything 
about that we can discuss.  We can talk about the weather; we can talk about 
social problems; we can talk about psychology; we can talk about international 
finance … so it’s the subject that nobody knows anything about that we can all 
talk about!”  (Feynman 1985) 
 
This is not the place to defend international finance (circa 1965) against the charge 
Feynman levels at it.  But suppose Feynman had picked on economic growth instead of 
international finance.  Would growth economists have a plausible riposte?  Is the reason 
we all talk so much about growth that we understand so little about it?   
 
It is certainly the case that growth theory is now a much more powerful tool than 
it was before Solow put pencil to paper.  And cross-country regressions have surely 
thrown out some useful correlations and stylized facts.  But at least at the more practical 
end of things—how do we make growth happen? —things have turned out to be 
somewhat disappointing.  By the mid-1980s, policy oriented economists had converged 
on a new consensus regarding the policy framework for growth.  We thought we knew a 
lot about what governments needed to do.  But as my Martian thought experiment at the 
beginning of the paper underscores, reality has been unkind to our expectations.  If Latin 
America was booming today and China and India were stagnating, we would have an 
easier time fitting the world to our policy framework.  Instead, we are straining to explain 
why unorthodox, two-track, gradualist reform paths have done so much better than sure-
fire adoption of the standard package.      
 
  Very few policy analysts think that the answer is to go back to old-style ISI, even 
though its record was certainly respectable for a very large number of countries.  
Certainly no-one one believes that central planning is a credible alternative.  But by the 
same token, few are now convinced that liberalization, deregulation, and privatization on 
their own hold the key to unleashing economic growth.  Maybe the right approach is to 
give up looking for “big ideas” altogether (as argued explicitly by Lindauer and Pritchett 
2002, and implicitly by Easterly 2001).  But that would be overshooting too.  Economics 
is full of big ideas on the importance of incentives, markets, budget constraints, and 
property rights.  It offers powerful ways of analyzing the allocative and distributional 
consequences of proposed policy changes.  The key is to realize that these principles do 
not translate directly into specific policy recommendations.  That translation requires the 
analyst to supply many additional ingredients that are contingent on the economic and 
political context, and cannot be done a priori.  Local conditions matter not because 
economic principles change from place to place, but because those principles come 
institution free and filling them out requires local knowledge.     
 
Therefore, the real lesson for the architects of growth strategies is to take 
economics more seriously, not less seriously.  But the relevant economics is that of the   30
seminar room, with its refusal to make unconditional generalizations and its careful 
examination of the contingent relation between the economic environment and policy 
implications.  Rule-of-thumb economics, which has come to dominate thinking on 
growth policies, can be safely discarded.   
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Figure 1 Table 1. Sources of growth by regions, 1960-2000 (percent increase) 
 
     Contribution  of: 
Region/Period   Output  Output per 
worker 
Physical capital  Education  Productivity 
 
World (84) 
     
1960-70    5.1 3.5 1.2 0.3 1.9 
1970-80  3.9 1.9 1.1 0.5 0.3 
1980-90  3.5 1.8 0.8 0.3 0.8 




     
1960-70    5.2 3.9 1.3 0.3 2.2 
1970-80  3.3 1.7 0.9 0.5 0.3 
1980-90  2.9 1.8 0.7 0.2 0.9 
1990-2000  2.5 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 
 
China (1) 
     
1960-70    2.8 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.5 
1970-80    5.3 2.8 1.6 0.4 0.7 
1980-90    9.2 6.8 2.1 0.4 4.2 
1990-2000  10.1  8.8 3.2 0.3 5.1 
 
East Asia less 
China (7) 
     
1960-70  6.4 3.7 1.7 0.4 1.5 
1970-80    7.6 4.3 2.7 0.6 0.9 
1980-90  7.2 4.4 2.4 0.6 1.3 




     
1960-70    5.5 2.8 0.8 0.3 1.6 
1970-80    6.0 2.7 1.2 0.3 1.1 
1980-90    1.1 -1.8 0.0 0.5 -2.3 
1990-2000    3.3 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.4 
 
South Asia (4) 
     
1960-70    4.2 2.2 1.2 0.3 0.7 
1970-80  3.0 0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.2 
1980-90    5.8 3.7 1.0 0.4 2.2 
1990-2000    5.3 2.8 1.2 0.4 1.2 
 
Africa (19) 
     
1960-70  5.2 2.8 0.7 0.2 1.9 
1970-80    3.6 1.0 1.3 0.1 -0.3 
1980-90    1.7 -1.1 -0.1 0.4 -1.4 
1990-2000    2.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 -0.5 
 
Middle East (9) 
     
1960-70    6.4 4.5 1.5 0.3 2.6 
1970-80    4.4 1.9 2.1 0.5 -0.6 
1980-90    4.0 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 
1990-2000    3.6 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.0 
 
 




“Augmented” Washington Consensus:  
 
 … the previous 10 items, plus: 
 
1.  Fiscal discipline 
 
2.  Reorientation of public expenditures 
 
3.  Tax reform 
 
4.  Interest rate liberalization 
 
5.  Unified and competitive exchange   
       rates 
 
6.  Trade liberalization 
 
7.  Openness to DFI 
 




10.Secure Property Rights 
  
11.  Corporate governance  
 
12.  Anti-corruption 
 
13.  Flexible labor markets 
 
14.  Adherence to WTO disciplines 
 
15.  Adherence to international financial codes and standards 
 
16.  “Prudent” capital-account opening  
 
17.  Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
 
18.  Independent central banks/inflation        
         targeting 
 
19.  Social safety nets 
 
20. Targeted poverty reduction 
  
 
Original Washington Consensus:   
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Source: Lora (2001a). Table 3:  East Asian anomalies 
 
Institutional domain  Standard ideal  “East Asian” pattern 
Property rights  Private, enforced by the rule of law  Private, but govt authority occasionally 
overrides the law (esp. in Korea).   
 
Corporate governance  Shareholder (“outsider”) control, 
protection of shareholder rights  
 
Insider control 




Decentralized, competitive markets, with 
tough anti-trust enforcement 
 
Horizontal and vertical integration in 
production (chaebol); government-
mandated “cartels” 
   
 Financial system  Deregulated, securities based, with free 
entry.  Prudential supervision through 
regulatory oversight.  
Bank based, restricted entry, heavily 
controlled by government, directed 
lending, weak formal regulation. 
 
Labor markets  Decentralized, de-institutionalized, 
“flexible” labor markets 
Lifetime employment in core enterprises 
(Japan) 
 
International capital flows  “prudently” free  Restricted (until the 1990s)  
 
Public ownership  None in productive sectors  Plenty in upstream industries. 
 
 Table 4:  The logic of the Washington Consensus and a Chinese counterfactual 
 
Problem   Solution 
 
Low agricultural productivity    Price liberalization 
 
Production incentives    Land privatization 
 
Loss of fiscal revenues    Tax reform 
 
Urban wages    Corporatization 
 
Monopoly   Trade  liberalization 
 
Enterprise restructuring    Financial sector reform 
 
Unemployment    Social safety nets 
 
… and so on     
  Table 5: How to understand/rationalize institutional anomalies:  four illustrations 
 
 
Objective  What is problem?  Institutional response  Prerequisites  Institutional 
complements 
Financial deepening 
(saving mobilization and 
efficient intermediation) 
Asymmetric information 
(investors know more 
about their projects than 
lenders do) 
and limited liability  
 
“Financial restraint” 
(Hellmann et al. 1997):  
controlled deposit rates 
and restricted entry  
 
—creation of rents to 
induce better portfolio 
risk management, better 
monitoring of firms, and 
increased deposit 
mobilization by banks. 
  
Ability to maintain 
restraint at moderate 
levels; 




Avoid state capture by 
financial interests.  
Finance: Highly 
regulated financial 
markets (absence of 
security markets and 
closed capital accounts 
to prevent cherry 
picking and rent 
dissipation); 
Politics:  State 
“autonomy” to prevent 
capture and decay into 
“crony capitalism.”  
  Table 5: How to understand/rationalize institutional anomalies:  four illustrations (cont.) 
 
 
Objective  What is problem?  Institutional response  Prerequisites  Institutional 
complements 
Spurring investment and 
entrepreneurship  in 
non-traditional activities 
 
Economies of scale 
together with inter-
industry linkages 
depress private return to 
entrepreneurship/invest
ment below social 
return. 
 





(Korea) and tax 
incentives (Taiwan) for 
selected sectors; 
--protection of home 
market coupled with 
export subsidies; 
--public enterprise 
creation for upstream 
products; 
--arm-twisting and 
cajoling by political 
leadership; 
--socialization of 




A high level of human 
capital relative to 
physical capital. 
A relatively competent 
bureaucracy to select 
investment projects.  
 
 
Trade:  Need to combine 
import protection (in 
selected sectors) with 
exposure to competition 
in export markets to  
distinguish high-
productivity firms from 
low-productivity ones; 
Business-government 
relations:  “Embedded 
autonomy” (Evans) to 
enable close interactions 
and information 
exchange while 
preventing state capture 
and decay into “crony 
capitalism.”  
 Table 5: How to understand/rationalize institutional anomalies:  four illustrations (cont.) 
 
 
Objective  What is problem?  Institutional response  Prerequisites  Institutional 
complements 
Productive organization 
of the workplace 
Tradeoff between 
information sharing 
(working together) and   
economies of 
specialization 
(specialized tasks)  
“horizontal hierarchy”  
(Aoki 1997) 
(unintended) fit with 
prewar arrangements of 
military resource 
mobilization in Japan 
Corporate governance: 
insider control to 
provide incentive for 
accumulating long-term 
managerial skills; 
Labor markets:  lifetime 
employment and 
enterprise unionism to 
generate long-term 
collaborative teamwork; 
Financial markets: main 
bank system to 
discipline firms and 
reduce the moral hazard 









 Table 5: How to understand/rationalize institutional anomalies:  four illustrations (cont.) 
 
 
Objective  What is problem?  Institutional response  Prerequisites  Institutional 
complements 
Reduce anti-export bias  Import-competing 
interests are politically 
powerful and opposed to 
trade liberalization  
export processing zone 
(Rodrik 1999) 
saving boom; elastic 
supply of foreign 
investment; preferential 
market access in EU  
Dual labor markets:  
segmentation between 
male and female labor 
force, so that increase 
female employment in 
the EPZ does not drive 
wages up in the rest of 
the economy. 
 





































What type of property rights? Private, 
public, cooperative? 
 
What type of legal regime?  Common 
law? Civil law?  Adopt or innovate? 
 
What is the right balance between 
decentralized market competition and 
public intervention? 
 
Which types of financial 
institutions/corporate governance are 
most appropriate for mobilizing 
domestic savings? 
 
Is there a public role to stimulate 
technology absorption and generation? 





Property rights: Ensure potential and 
current investors can retain the returns 
to their investments  
 
Incentives: Align producer incentives 
with social costs and benefits. 
 
Rule of law:  Provide a transparent, 








Productive efficiency  
(static and dynamic) 





































How independent should the central 
bank be? 
 
What is the appropriate exchange-rate 
regime? (dollarization, currency board, 
adjustable peg, controlled float, pure 
float)  
 
Should fiscal policy be rule-bound, and 
if so what are the appropriate rules? 
 
Size of the public economy. 
 
What is the appropriate regulatory 
apparatus for the financial system?  
 
What is the appropriate regulatory 








Sound money:  Do not generate liquidity 
beyond the increase in nominal money 
demand at reasonable inflation.  
 
Fiscal sustainability:  Ensure public debt 
remains “reasonable” and stable in 
relation to national aggregates.    
 
Prudential regulation:  Prevent financial 

































How progressive should the tax system 
be? 
 
Should pension systems be public or 
private? 
 
What are the appropriate points of 
intervention:  educational system? 
access to health?  access to credit?  labor 
markets?  tax system?  
 
What is the role of “social funds”? 
 
Redistribution of endowments? (land 
reform, endowments-at-birth)   
 
Organization of labor markets: 
decentralized or institutionalized? 
 
Modes of service delivery: NGOs, 






Targeting: Redistributive programs 
should be targeted as closely as possible 
to the intended beneficiaries.  
 
Incentive compatibility:  Redistributive 






















Argentina 1989  -2.73 4.77 7.51 
Brazil 1966  2.00 7.05 5.05 
Barbados 1965  3.43 6.75 3.32 
Barbados 1982  1.36 4.36 3.00 
Botswana 1966  -1.00 9.85 10.85 
Chile 1985  -2.51 5.40 7.91 
China 1978  1.30 6.53 5.23 
China 1989  3.67 7.36 3.69 
Cameroon 1971  -0.13 4.30 4.43 
Congo, Rep  1969  0.36 4.46 4.09 
Congo, Rep  1977  2.44 6.71 4.27 
Cape Verde  1975  -3.21 8.76 11.97 
Cyprus 1961  -1.46 5.89 7.34 
Cyprus 1974  2.09 6.55 4.46 
Denmark 1955  1.65 4.89 3.24 
Dominican Rep  1967  -1.28 5.19 6.47 
Dominican Rep  1989  1.52 4.62 3.10 
Ecuador 1968  1.54 7.11 5.57 
Egypt 1976  -3.36 4.10 7.47 
Spain 1959  3.41 6.98 3.57 
Fiji 1965  0.42 4.85 4.44 
Ghana 1963  1.03 5.16 4.14 
Guinea-Bissau 1969  -1.01 5.93 6.93 
Guinea-Bissau 1986  -1.70 4.29 5.99 
Equatorial Guinea  1989  -2.07 5.85 7.93 
Grenada 1982  1.45 5.11 3.66 
Guyana 1988  1.26 4.43 3.18 
Haiti 1987  -1.96 7.72 9.68 
Indonesia 1967  -0.72 5.33 6.05 
Ireland 1985  1.58 4.67 3.09 
Iran 1989  -3.31 4.52 7.83 
Iceland 1970  -0.72 4.48 5.21 
Israel 1955  0.73 4.92 4.19 
Israel 1967  0.90 4.57 3.67 
Jordan 1972  -5.10 7.53 12.63 
Japan 1958  5.76 8.90 3.14 
St. Kitts and Nevis  1989  3.03 6.61 3.58 
South Korea  1962  -0.16 6.93 7.09 
South Korea  1982  3.04 7.72 4.68 
St. Lucia  1985  2.47 6.34 3.88 
Lesotho 1969  0.74 4.99 4.25 
Luxembourg 1983  0.76 5.40 4.64 
Morocco 1957  -2.18 5.89 8.06 Mauritius 1969  -2.96 5.37 8.33 
Mauritius 1982  0.36 4.97 4.62 
Malaysia 1986  1.03 5.64 4.61 
Nicaragua 1959  0.05 4.18 4.14 
Pakistan 1960  -2.50 4.32 6.82 
Pakistan 1977  1.25 4.28 3.04 
Panama 1958  1.60 5.20 3.60 
Peru 1959  0.36 4.08 3.72 
Portugal 1984  0.58 4.20 3.62 
Romania 1980  -4.60 7.95 12.55 
Singapore 1968  1.92 7.92 6.01 
Seychelles 1968  1.29 6.20 4.91 
Seychelles 1985  -2.08 4.04 6.12 
Syria 1969  -0.37 4.06 4.43 
Chad 1971  0.05 4.10 4.05 
Thailand 1955  -4.50 5.33 9.84 
Thailand 1985  3.60 7.60 4.00 
Trinidad and Tobago  1971  1.28 4.82 3.54 
Tunisia 1966  2.46 6.14 3.68 
Taiwan 1961  3.73 7.27 3.54 
Zimbabwe 1962  0.43 6.97 6.53 
 
























































































































Source: Penn World Tables 6.1Table 10: A taxonomy of “natural” barriers to industrialization 
 
A. Learning  externalities 
 
1.  Learning-by-doing (e.g., Matsuyama, 1992) 
 
2.  Human capital externalities (e.g., Azariadis and Drazen, 1990) 
 
3.  Learning about costs (e.g., Hausmann and Rodrik, 2002) 
 
B.   Coordination failures (market-size externalities induced by IRS) 
  
1.  Wage premium in manufacturing (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989) 
 
2.  Infrastructure (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989) 
 
3.  Specialized intermediate inputs (e.g., Rodrik 1994, 1995)  
 
4.  Spillovers associated with wealth distribution (e.g., Hoff and Stiglitz 2001) 
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Figure 4:  Real exchange rate and growth in Chile and Uganda Table 11: A taxonomy of market-sustaining institutions 
 
  Market-creating institutions 
o  Property rights 
o  Contract enforcement 
  Market-regulating institutions 
o  Regulatory bodies 
o  Other mechanisms for correcting market failures 
  Market-stabilizing institutions 
o  Monetary and fiscal institutions 
o  Institutions of prudential regulation and supervision 
  Market-legitimizing institutions 
o  Democracy 
o  Social protection and social insurance 
 
 